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Abstract. Compared to many other areas of cyber security, vulnerabil-
ities in industrial control systems (ICS) can be poorly understood. These
systems form part of critical national infrastructure, where asset owners
may not understand the security landscape and have potentially incor-
rect security assumptions for these closed source, operational technology
(OT) systems. ICS vulnerability reports give useful information about
single vulnerabilities, but there is a lack of guidance telling ICS owners
what to look for next, or how to find these. In this paper, we analyse 9
years of ICS Advisory vulnerability announcements and we recategorise
the vulnerabilities based on the detection methods and tools that could
be used to find these weaknesses. We find that 8 categories are enough to
cover 95% of the vulnerabilities in the dataset. This provides a guide for
ICS owners to the most likely new vulnerabilities they may find in their
systems and the best ways to detect them. We validate our proposed
vulnerability categories by analysing a further 6 months of ICS Advisory
reports, which shows that our categories continue to dominate the re-
ported weaknesses. We further validate our proposed detection methods
by applying them to a range of ICS equipment and finding four new
critical security vulnerabilities.
1 Introduction
Industrial Control Systems (ICS) form a key part of the critical national in-
frastructure and industrial environments. Attacks against ICS devices, such as
Stuxnet [9], BlackEnergy [18] and Triton [16], have aim to cause disruption and
damage ICS equipment. Many ICS environments were segregated from IT net-
works, however most now exist on the same, heterogeneous network, opening
them up to a wide range of attacks.
In recognition of the importance of ICS cybersecurity, the European Union
Network and Information Systems (NIS) Directive came into force in May 2018.
Member states are required to define essential services and improve infrastruc-
ture security and resilience in identified sectors. The NIS Directive shifted re-
sponsibility for assurance onto asset owners, who may lack cybersecurity under-
standing of what vulnerabilities and issues exist in the ICS space. IT Security
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is considered a well-understood problem, with insights available to OT opera-
tors. However, there are different assumptions and requirements placed on OT
devices, for example operational lifespan measured in the order of decades, not
years, and safety which may not exist in IT environments. By reviewing what
vulnerabilities exist in the industrial space, we can define what priorities for as-
set owners and the supply chain should be and how they can be addressed and
detected to improve industrial security.
ICS environments are typically made up of Programmable Logic Controllers
(PLCs), automating a process given a set of inputs, controlling outputs. PLCs
may be connected to sensors, actuators and Human Machine Interfaces (HMIs),
operator control panels displaying the state of the system and allow an operator
to interface with the process. Other components, such as Supervisory Control
and Data Acquisition (SCADA) may be integrated for logging, analytics and
control purposes, and Remote Terminal Units (RTUs), enable remote manage-
ment for devices. The exception of some SCADA systems that run on standard
PCs is that these are usually provided to the ICS owner as proprietorial, closed
source software running on unidentified hardware. Sometimes, the security as-
sumptions made by the designers of this equipment are not clear, and there is
no easy way for ICS owners to inspect and run their own software on the ICS
equipment. This makes the security controls and issues for ICS equipment quite
different from, e.g., securing desktop machines and servers in a company set-
ting. Therefore, general work on common vulnerability categories and detection
methods does not carry over to the ICS domain.
To provide insight into vulnerabilities in ICS environments, this paper car-
ries out a detailed review of nine years of ICS-CERT Advisories and related
data. This tells us the kinds of vulnerabilities that commonly occur in ICS en-
vironments. We analyse this data, identifying trends and what kind of detection
methods could find the vulnerabilities. Based on this analysis, we suggest eight
categories for the vulnerabilities based on concrete detection methods. These
categories cover 95% of all vulnerabilities in our dataset and give the ICS owner
clear steps they can follow to find the weaknesses, and advise vendors on priority
areas to resolve. It is important to note that our analysis is purely concerned
with the kind of vulnerability in ICS systems that leads to an ICS advisory, i.e.,
a new flaw in the security of a system. There are many other weaknesses which
might be exploited to attack an ICS systems, such as phishing e-mails, or the use
of unpatched systems with known vulnerabilities. Most of these issues are well
addressed by existing IT security methods and practices. This gives ICS owners
an understanding of the types of vulnerabilities that exist in an accessible way,
where current information is ambiguous and, as a result, not actionable. Our
categories enable an asset owner to act, with appropriate tooling and techniques
such that they can be confident in the security of their infrastructures.
To validate the categories and trends we identify, we look at an extra six
months of ICS advisory reports. We find that our eight categories continue to
dominate the advisories (accounting for 96% of the new vulnerabilities) and
each category is well represented. To validate the category detection methods
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we apply the automated methods to three PLCs and two HMIs from major ICS
manufacturers. As a result we find six new attacks against the ICS equipment
four of which would be ranked as critical: two denial of service attacks, an open
redirect on a web control panel, and an authentication bypass. Responsible dis-
closure for these vulnerabilities is ongoing and we will make the information
public once ICS advisories have been released.
Our contributions are as follows:
– combining a number of data sources together, we present a detailed analysis
of ICS vulnerabilities and trends,
– suggesting new eight categories for classifying ICS vulnerabilities that are
based on detection methods,
– validating the trends and categories against 6 months of new vulnerability
reports, and our detection methods by applying them to five pieces of ICS
equipment finding 4 new critical vulnerabilities.
In Section 2, we outline our process for connecting sources of data, outlining
key statistics and priority areas. We go further to define detectable vulnerability
classes to test for such vulnerabilities in Section 3 and predict future ICS vul-
nerabilities and validate these predictions in Section 4, concluding in Section 5.
Related Work: ICS security research is an active field, where most research
focuses on vulnerability research in specific devices and implementations [4, 20,
13, 5] which highlight particular flaws and are aimed towards finding new flaws
and proposing resolutions to improve collective ICS security. These however do
not consider the security of ICS as a whole and what common types of vulnera-
bility exist. On the other hand, a chronology of ICS security incidents provides
a thorough analysis of high-profile incidents [12], but some commercially-led
research papers [1, 7, 8, 17, 19] have carried out ICS vulnerability analysis and
provide highlights of some of the vulnerability categories that exist, but do not
consider all vulnerabilities, or show only a few categories. The last assessment
report from ICS-CERT highlighting the top weakness categories in ICS was
published in 2016, where no authoritative report has since replaced it [14]. More
recently, the authors in [10] review ICS vulnerability reports to determine how
many resulted from architectural design decisions, but simply state common root
causes. In [15], the authors propose a linked and correlated database for ICS vul-
nerabilities, to support security operations centres, but additionally categorise
vulnerabilities into 6 categories, which do not lend themselves towards detecting
such vulnerability categories, and do not provide the level of detail required for
ICS owners and supply chain to improve their respective security models. Simi-
lar work as part of the OpenCTI project1 has attempted to make vulnerability
information accessible, however, it requires significant expert efforts to integrate
for ICS vulnerability reports, and again, informs the ICS owner and vendor what
has happened, but not how it can be resolved, or detected.
1 https://opencti.io

























Fig. 1. Parsing and Processing Workflow to create our Dataset. ICS Advisories are
parsed, and when a CWE/CVE ID is found, the corresponding record is parsed and
the information brought together before being committed into the database.
2 Connecting Sources of Data for Vulnerability Insights
Data Sources and Building the Dataset: ICS vulnerabilities are reported
and published in a number of places, for example vendor websites, CVE listings
and ICS-CERT. For ICS owners and vendors, it is not clear which source is au-
thoritative and provides the best whole-of-sector coverage. A number of vendors
individually publish advisories, however in a survey of a number of common ICS
vendors, we found that some required a support contract/approval to gain ac-
cess to security reports, which limits this coverage if vendors were used as the
primary source. Our ICS vulnerability dataset is therefore built up from three
sources: ICS-CERT advisories, MITRE and the National Vulnerability Database
(NVD). ICS-CERT advisories are the root source of information, where refer-
ences to MITRE and the NVD are used to extract further information. A work-
flow which imports these sources is given in Figure 1.
ICS-CERT Advisories: These are published by the USA Cybersecurity and
Infrastructure Security Agency (CISA), providing authoritative vulnerability in-
formation to the ICS community. To the best of our knowledge, it is the most
comprehensive source of ICS vulnerability information. These reports are in
HTML format2, which we convert into plaintext and markdown to flatten all
formatting, making it easier to extract reference fields for CWEs and CVE num-
bers. When we find these we retrieve the corresponding record and import some
fields from those sources to provide context to the vulnerability information.
MITRE CWEs: The MITRE Corporation is responsible for two schemes
used within our dataset; Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE) and Common
Vulnerability and Exposure (CVE). While MITRE provides CVE information in
a machine-readable format, it is not as full-featured as the National Vulnerability
Database’s input to CVE information, for example appraisals of the impact and
2 An example is available at https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ics/advisories/ICSA-17-
157-01.
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criticality of that vulnerability in addition to further analysis, such as listing
affected products.
The CWE or root cause identifier stated in ICS advisories, however, is used in
our analysis. These are unique, distinct vulnerability patterns and anti-patterns
in software development, which can express the type of vulnerability that exists.
One benefit of CWEs is that they can be grouped together to give types of
vulnerability, e.g. memory or web vulnerabilities [21].
National Vulnerability Database (NVD) CVEs : The NVD, provided by NIST,
takes the CVE information, analyses and assesses the vulnerability. This assess-
ment allocates the CVSS score, used to define the criticality and impact of the
vulnerability, how it may be exploited and under what conditions the system
was exploitable. NIST CVEs are provided in JSON files, which we parse. When
a CVE reference is found, the corresponding CVE record is retrieved, tagged
with the CWE referenced in the ICS advisory and is imported.
The Combined Dataset Our dataset3 is built from 1,114 ICS vulnerability
reports, with 283 distinct CWE references, and 2,232 CVEs, collected from 2011,
when ICS Advisories started to be published to August 2019 (this cut-off was
chosen to allow sufficient new vulnerabilities to be produced, allowing valida-
tion of our results). The dataset contains the ICS advisory number, release and
update dates, the name of the vendor affected and a short description which in-
cludes the product affected. For CWEs found in the ICS advisory, we include the
CWE ID, the name of the CWE, a brief description and contextual background
details, and the CWE status (e.g. if it has been deprecated). CVEs stated in the
ICS advisory include the number, description, base, impact4 and exploitability4
scores, CVSS vector, severity, access vector, complexity to exploit, availability,
integrity and confidentiality impact, the list of privileges required, the impact
on system privileges and whether user interaction is required for the exploit to
be successful.
Limitations of Existing Data Sources In isolation, these sources provide little
contextual information and means to identify trends and types of vulnerabili-
ties that exist in ICS systems. By connecting ICS advisories to CWE-specific
information, we can categorise the type of vulnerabilities that arise in the ICS
domain, identify patterns and follow trends. With CVSS, we do not use the as-
signed scores, where the vector components provide concrete information about
the impact of the vulnerability, as the impact scores does not exist in CVSS v2,
but all have a defined vector, where 791 of 2,232 CVEs in our dataset do not
have these numerical scores. Other fields and content are also not imported, e.g.
acknowledgements, researchers or URLs as these are not relevant in our analysis.
Accuracy of the data being used is critical, where a survey of ICS vulner-
ability data quality showed that in 2018, 32% of ICS CVEs had the wrong
CVSS score assigned [7], improving to 19% [8] in 2019. The combination of
3 Available at https://github.com/uob-ritics/esorics2020-dataset
4 Exists only in CVSS v3
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Grouping Prevalence Availability Integrity
CWE/SANS Top 25 (2011) 24% 11% 10%
CWE Weaknesses on the Cusp (2011) 2% 1% 1%
CWE Top 25 (2019) 48% 28% 18%
Table 1. Coverage of ICS Vulnerabilities for existing mappings. For the number of ICS
vulnerabilities which have a ‘COMPLETE’ or ‘HIGH’ impact value.
these sources mitigates the risk, where we use the most current version of the
record, rather than its first instance. Out of 1097 ICS Advisories surveyed up
to August 2019, 197 had been updated, which may include additional products
affected, new vulnerabilities identified, or new mitigations, for example patch
availability. Without using the most current information, these additional vul-
nerabilities may have been overlooked. These, however, generally do not require
further analysis, unless some new, unclustered CWEs were introduced.
3 Understanding and Classifying Vulnerabilities
Understanding the Type of ICS Vulnerabilities: In order to categorise all
ICS vulnerabilities and define detection strategies, we must first understand the
ICS vulnerability landscape. In order to categorise these vulnerabilities, as we
explain later in this section, we must consider existing groupings.
MITRE offers a number of groupings of CWEs, for example based on the
OWASP Top 10 and the CWE Top 25 Most Dangerous Software Errors. In Ta-
ble 1, we map our dataset onto existing clusters (groupings) based on prevalence,
and the number of CVEs that had a high impact on the integrity or availability
of the system. We note that firstly, these mappings are not mutually exclusive;
one CWE may exist in more than one SFP cluster. Secondly, these mappings
do not capture the majority of the dataset, where the CWE Top 25 leaves over
50% unclassified.
The CWE contains clusters defined around the concept of software fault
patterns (SFPs), which contains most of the CWEs specified in ICS advisories
with no overlap between clusters. These CWEs are mapped to a specific cluster,
e.g. memory access (CWE-890) and cryptography (CWE-903). Out of the 2,232
CVEs in our dataset, 1,801 could be mapped directly to a SFP cluster. For the
remaining 431 CVEs, we manually assigned them to a respective cluster based
on the stated issue (e.g. buffer overflow or cross-site scripting attack) in the
ICS Advisory and CVE description. As an example, Cross-Site Request Forgery
attacks (CWE-352) have no mapping, but are web-based attacks which are ex-
ploited through malicious input, and thus, we categorise it as ‘Tainted Input’,
where other web-based weaknesses sit. This manual expert analysis ensures that
all CWEs are represented within the correct categories rather than ‘Other’. The
result of this classification is shown in Figure 2, where we group the vulnerability
subclasses, highlight the types of vulnerability that exist within the category and
rank vulnerabilities based on the number of CVEs with a ‘high’ or ‘complete’
(critical) CVSS availability and integrity impact. The objective of introducing a
‘Zone 1’ and ‘Zone 2’ is to highlight priority areas, where it is expected that, as


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 2. A map of vulnerabilities from our dataset where each subclass (mark) is ranked
based on the prevalence, availability (A) and integrity (I), and subclasses with a higher
number of CVEs with critical impact rank higher. Each line represents a MITRE
CWE Grouping, and each ’station’ represents a subclass within that grouping. Zone
1 subclasses where ≥ 15 CVEs has a critical availability/integrity impact, and Zone 2
has ≥ 10 CVEs with a critical impact.
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addressed, where classes with 15 or more critical impact CVEs are in ‘Zone 1’
and those with 10 or more are in ‘Zone 2’.
Defining a Better Classification for ICS Vulnerabilities: While the group-
ings and subclasses provided in Figure 2 have distinct types of ICS vulnerabili-
ties, they do not guide ICS owners and vendors in their detection, and contain
some ambiguity. This means that, for a given grouping, many detection methods
may apply but have different outcomes. Such examples include ‘Tainted Input to
Variable’ and ‘Information Leakage’ where it may not be clear to an ICS owner
what the effect was or how it may be detected.
We propose 8 new detectable, evidence-driven, vulnerability categories, de-
fined below, which categorise vulnerabilities based on the detection method and
techniques that can be used by ICS owners and vendors. These categories enable
vendors and asset owners to understand the type of vulnerabilities that exist,
where the current information is vague and lacks an application context. Our
categories capture 95%5 of all vulnerabilities within our dataset with a clear
definition and specific detection methods. An overview of these methods is given
in Table 2.
By classifying vulnerabilities in this way, ICS owners and vendors are able
to identify techniques in which such classes of vulnerability can be found, how
such vulnerabilities are manifested, and furthermore, aids in the validation of
ICS device security. In Figure 3, we show the flow of ICS CVEs from their CWE
groupings to our new categories. These flows are built by tagging each CVE in
the dataset with its old grouping and its new detectable category and mapping
changes from the old tag to the new one, where we clustered like CWEs together
under a common name, based on their detectable method. For the purposes of
legibility, where the count of CVEs flowing from one grouping to a category was
less than 10, we exclude it from the figure (137 of 2,232 CVEs). 6
For each of our detectable vulnerability categories, we give a precise definition
and an example where a prominent ICS attack fits into that category.
Web-based Weaknesses: These vulnerabilities represent flaws and weaknesses
that exist in web-based applications, for example path traversal, cross-site script-
ing (XSS), and cross-site request forgery (CSRF), which can be detected through
conventional web scanners.
Example: The BlackEnergy [18] malware campaign, which targeted the
Ukrainian power grid in 2015, used a vulnerability (CVE-2014-0751) in a GE
SCADA web interface that allowed the attack to execute shell code.
Default Credentials: The use of default and hardcoded sensitive credentials has a
distinct detection method, where this category has a clear proportion of vulner-
abilities over time as shown in Figure 4. Vulnerabilities in this category consider
5 Of all CVEs categorised, 94% with high availability and integrity impacts were cat-
egorised.



























































Fig. 3. Flow of CVEs from their original CWE groupings to our detectable classes.
a system, as delivered, having hardcoded credentials or sensitive data (e.g. SSH
keys) which an adversary can recover and use.
Example: Stuxnet [9] targeted and damaged Iranian nuclear centrifuges. In
the case of the Siemens system affected by Stuxnet, it contained hard-coded
passwords, allowing the adversary to gain access to privileged functions (CVE-
2010-2772).
Denial of Service and Resource Exhaustion: These vulnerabilities result in the
loss of availability given a non-standard input which does not trigger some
memory-related flaw in the system.
Example: CRASHOVERRIDE [6] was an attack which affected a Ukrainian
power tranmission system, forcing the circuit breakers to remain in an open posi-
tion, even if override commands were issued. The Siemens SIPROTEC protection
relay was vulnerable to a denial of service attack (CVE-2015-5374).
Exposed Sensitive Data: Vulnerabilities in this category allow unauthenticated
users to access sensitive information. Such information could be leaked via log
and debug messages or stored in an openly accessible location. From our dataset,
most vulnerabilities classed as information leakage either leaked user credentials
or some other sensitive information.
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Table 2. Comparison of detection methods for our proposed categories.
Example: Of the 202 vulnerabilities classed using the SFP clusters as ‘Ex-
posed Data’ in Figure 2, only 143 were cases of sensitive information leakage,
specifically around the insecure storage of data. One of the high impact vulner-
abilities in our dataset affected a Kunbus Modbus gateway, where credentials
were stored in plain-text XML configurations, accessible via an FTP server on
the device (CVE-2019-6549). Another vulnerability, from a LOYTEC industrial
router, allowed password hashes to be read from the device and then recovered
(CVE-2015-7906).
Weak and Broken Cryptography: In this category we include cryptography that
is weak by design (e.g. proprietorial crypto), as well as strong cryptography
that is used incorrectly, allowing it to be broken. This extends the definition of














2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019
Permissions and Resource Access Control Privilege Escalation and Authentication Weaknesses Weak and Broken Cryptography
Default Credentials Denial of Service and Resource Exhaustion Exposed Sensitive Data
Memory and Buffer Management Web-based Weaknesses Other
Fig. 4. ICS Vulnerabilities mapped against our new detectable classes
Example: In the case of Rogue7 [5], the MAC scheme implemented to
guarantee integrity and authenticity of data between an engineering workstation
(TIA Portal) and a Siemens PLC was weak, allowing an adversary to imperson-
ate a genuine workstation to program the PLC (CVE-2019-10929). In another
example using weak cryptography is the use of MD5 highlighted by CVE-2019-
6563, this allows an adversary to recover passwords and gain full access to a
Moxa industrial switch.
Memory and Buffer Management: Vulnerabilities which specifically relate to
memory and buffer implementation flaws, for example buffer overflows, allowing
an adversary to influence functionality by manipulating the memory of a system.
Example: Two example CVEs arising out of the Triton attack [16], target-
ing Schneider Electric safety management systems and modifying their configu-
rations to modify, or in some cases disable the fail-safe protocols, are CVE-2018-
8872 and CVE-2018-7522. In the first, memory was read directly from addresses
without any verification and attacker-controlled data could be written anywhere
in memory. In the case of CVE-2018-8872, the system registers were located in
fixed areas of memory where modifying these registers would allow the adversary
to control the system state.
Permissions and Resource Access Control: These vulnerabilities allow a user
to carry out arbitrary actions on a system using standard interfaces with the
privilege of another user. This could, for instance, be due to incorrect assignment
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of privileges, functions being executed with excessive permissions, or a lack of
access control for a given resource.
Example: On an Emerson SCADA system, an authenticated user’s actions
were not restricted, allowing executables and library files to be changed (CVE-
2018-14791), potentially affecting the integrity of the system configuration and
its availability. In another case, by using standard interfaces on a Schneider
Electric PLC, an unauthenticated adversary could overwrite the password which
protects the running program (CVE-2018-7791).
Privilege Escalation and Authentication Weaknesses: These vulnerabilities allow
a user, privileged or not, to change their state of privilege in the system through
non-standard means. The most prevalent type of vulnerability in this category is
‘Authentication Bypass’, where an unauthenticated user can become privileged
by interacting with the system via an alternative entry point.
Example: Stuxnet, one of the first prominent attacks against an ICS system,
used a vulnerability in the Siemens programming software that allowed adver-
saries to gain privileges by using a trojan DLL (CVE-2012-3015). This would
give the adversary full control of the system state.
Discussion: 5% of vulnerabilities held in our dataset do not map directly into
these distinct categories, shown in Figure 3. These vulnerabilities do not have
high levels of prevalence or critical impact and require more manual, case-by-case
inspection by an expert.
To demonstrate the continued prevalence of these categories over time, Fig-
ure 4 shows these remain largely within proportion over time. We also note that
the distribution of detectable categories against a sample of CVEs is even, where
the same detectable categories exist across most ICS device types as well as ven-
dors, as shown in Figures 5 and 6. It is important, however, to note that in
Figure 5, we show the top 6 vendors by CVE prevalence, and this should not be
interpreted such that one vendor is considered more vulnerable than another, as
different vendors have very different market shares.
Table 2 shows tooling that can be used to detect vulnerabilities for our 8
categories. Other tooling can be used by ICS owners to discover assets (e.g.
GRASSMARLIN) and identify whether their product is vulnerable to existing,
known, CVEs (e.g. Simaticscan [3], PIVoT [2], Modscan [11] and Nessus).
4 Validating Our Categories and Detection Methods
Assessing Our Categories Against New Data: For our categories to be useful for
detecting new vulnerabilities we must be sure that future vulnerabilities follow
the same trends as those in our dataset. At some point it is likely that industry
will improve its practices, for instance, fixing the use of default passwords or
carefully checking the security of all web interfaces, meaning that categories we
have identified may no longer be relevant.
To test this we compared our finding to the ICS advisories issued between
September 2019 and March 2020 (which were not included in our original dataset).
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Fig. 5. The prevalence of detectable categories for the top 6 vendors by CVE count.
In this period, 126 new ICS advisories were published with 334 CVE references,
which were parsed into our database and the same process to automatically clas-
sify the CVEs based on their CWE ID was taken, with final manual refinements
for some CVEs that had previously unmapped CWE references.
Of the 334 CVEs parsed, 322 were directly mapped into our vulnerability
classes, and 12 were not classified, an accuracy of 96%. Of the 12 vulnerabilities
which were not classified, 3 related to vulnerabilities affecting ‘Path Traversal’
within software, a different type of vulnerability to web path traversal, 2 related
to input validation, and 7 individual vulnerabilities, two of which occurred in
the same product.
What this level of accuracy shows is that, with 6 months of new data, we are
able to predict with high confidence which of 8 possible categories new ICS CVEs
will map to, with specific tooling to support validation and verification activities.
There is no sign of industry having seriously addressed any of the categories we
identify. However, by using this data-driven approach and the tools we identified
which support the identification of issues within our detectable categories, there
is an opportunity to reduce the vulnerability space.
Validating Security Tooling and Techniques for ICS In order to validate our
suggested detection methods, and to provide evidence that our categorisation
does assist in finding new vulnerabilities, we applied our “easy to use” detection
methods listed in Table 2 to five ICS devices - two HMIs (Phoenix Contact and
Siemens) and three PLCs (two Siemens PLCs and one ABB PLC). Neither HMI
had a web server, whereas all PLCs have web-servers enabled, two of which re-
quired some form of authentication to gain access to privileged functions. We did
14 R. J. Thomas and T. Chothia
SCADA (454) PLC (240) Networking (233)
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Fig. 6. The prevalence of detectable categories across different product types from a
sample of 1199 CVEs.
PLC1 PLC2 PLC3 HMI1 HMI2 Result
Default Credentials (from user manual) X Manual Updated
NMAP (authentication bypass) X Discussed in text
Wireshark (information leakage) X CVE-2020-7592 Issued
Low Orbit Ion Cannon (Denial of Service) X X CVE due to be released
OWASP ZAP (Web Vulnerabilities) X Update to be issued
Table 3. Results from our tooling validation, X = new vulnerabilities discovered
not have access to the source code of the devices, so we did not run tools which
required this, or tools that required paid licenses. These results of our analysis
are summarised in Table 3. It is important to note that using our categories, we
are able to use the most appropriate tooling, and demonstrate how they can be
taken from an IT environment and applied to OT systems. Some devices remain
anonymised as the disclosure and resolution is ongoing with the vendors.
In one PLC, a previous CVE for denial of service was issued where long inputs
to the web server would cause the device to enter ‘Stop’ mode and crashing. In
our testing using Low Orbit Ion Cannon7, we found that in the patched version,
the web server would stop responding during and after a packet flood, but unlike
the CVE (where the PLC would also crash), we found the PLC would continue
running in this patched version. This new vulnerability would cause the ICS
owner to lose visibility of the PLC via the web portal. Using the same tool on a
HMI, we found that it would become unresponsive during a flood, resuming some
time after the flood stopped. On that same HMI, we found default credentials in
an online manual which would provide access to change its configuration, where
no credentials are given with the device. For the HMI DoS, a CVE will be issued,
and for the default password, the manual will be revised to state this risk.
7 https://github.com/NewEraCracker/LOIC
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Using standard web-scanners as unauthenticated/authenticated users, OWASP
ZAP found that the Siemens S7-1200 web portal was found to have a high-
criticality Open Redirect (CWE-601), which, given a malicious URL, the PLC
would redirect users to an arbitrary website. We manually validated the scanner’s
findings for each identified weakness as part of a validation exercise. Burpsuite,
however, did not find this vulnerability due to the implementation of the login
form, where ZAP was able to follow the login process without any issues. Siemens
confirmed this was an related issue to CVE-2015-1048 and will be patched.
For HMI2 (Siemens KTP700), which was unaffected by the Denial of Service
tests, we found that part of its configuration was sent in the clear using Wireshark
to capture the configuration process, leaking content which would be displayed
on the screen. Siemens confirmed this as an issue, issuing CVE-2020-7592 in
response to our disclosure. Finally, on the PLC which was not vulnerable to
Web and Denial of Service issues, we found that where the web server requires
authentication, an alternative entry point (found by using nmap) was found,
where reverse engineering the app commands and submitting them to this entry
point would give the user access to the same functionality without using a web
portal. The vendor said the device should only be used on trusted networks. The
vector was valid, but users should use the PLC in a secure environment.
Discussion: Using these techniques, we find six new vulnerabilities in ICS de-
vices for which we are completing responsible disclosure with the respective
vendors. All are CVE-worthy but have differing severity. For PLC1, an adver-
sary could control the PLC state, and the web interface of PLC2 could redirect
the user to a malicious website with more serious consequences. In PLC3, the
visibility of the PLC is lost via the web portal, but its logic continues to run,
which we believe not to be critical. For HMI1, the default credentials is not a
critical issue, with the denial of service a more critical issue, as the operator may
not be able to interact with the system. In the case of HMI2, the cleartext data
issue is not critical, as more sensitive information, e.g. credentials, are encrypted.
5 Conclusion
ICS security has important differences to standard IT, such as vulnerability
classes and detection. By analysing nine years of ICS vulnerability reports, iden-
tifying trends and suggesting eight new categories for classifying ICS vulnerabil-
ities based on detection methods, we can better inform ICS owners and vendors
on the types of ICS vulnerabilities, how they can be detected and prioritised
for resolution. We discuss easy automated and in-depth testing methods for ICS
owners and experts, validating our results on six months of new reports and
analysing five pieces of ICS equipment, finding four new critical vulnerabilities.
Acknowledgements: Funding for this paper was provided by the National
Cyber Security Centre UK (NCSC UK), Research Institute in Trustworthy Inter-
Connected Cyber-Physical Systems (RITICS) and the UK Rail Research and
Innovation Network (UKRRIN). We thank the Bristol Cyber Security Group for
providing access to an additional device for testing.
16 R. J. Thomas and T. Chothia
References
1. Andreeva, O., Gordeychik, S., Gritsai, G., Kochetova, O., Potseluevskaya, E.,
Sidorov, S.I., Timorin, A.A.: Industrial Control Systems Vulnerabilities Statistics.
Kaspersky Lab, Report (2016)
2. Antrobus, R., Green, B., Frey, S., Rashid, A.: The Forgotten I in IIoT: a vulnera-
bility scanner for industrial internet of things. IET (2019)
3. Antrobus, R., Frey, S., Green, B., Rashid, A.: Simaticscan: Towards a specialised
vulnerability scanner for industrial control systems. In: 4th International Sympo-
sium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research (2016)
4. Beresford, D.: Exploiting Siemens Simatic S7 PLCs. Black Hat USA (2011)
5. Biham, E., Bitan, S., Carmel, A., Dankner, A., Malin, U., Wool, A.: Rogue7: Rogue
Engineering-Station attacks on S7 Simatic PLCs. Black Hat USA (2019)
6. Dragos: CRASHOVERRIDE: Analysis of Threat to Electric Grid Operations
(2017)
7. Dragos: 2018 Year in Review - Industrial Controls System Vulnerabilities (2018)
8. Dragos: 2019 Year in Review - ICS Vulnerabilities (2019)
9. Falliere, N., Murchu, L.O., Chien, E.: W32. stuxnet dossier. White paper, Symantec
Corp., Security Response (2011)
10. Gonzalez, D., Alhenaki, F., Mirakhorli, M.: Architectural security weaknesses in
industrial control systems (ics) an empirical study based on disclosed software
vulnerabilities. In: 2019 IEEE International Conference on Software Architecture
(ICSA) (2019)
11. Hankin, C., Chothia, T., M3, P., Popov, P., Rashid, A., Sezer, S.: Availability of
Open Source Tool-Sets for CNI-ICS (2018)
12. Hemsley, K.E., Fisher, E., et al.: History of Industrial Control System Cyber Inci-
dents. Tech. rep. (2018)
13. Hui, H., McLaughlin, K.: Investigating current PLC security issues regarding
Siemens S7 communications and TIA Portal. In: 5th International Symposium
for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research (2018)
14. Industrial Control Systems Cyber Emergency Response Team: ICS-CERT Annual
Assessment Report FY 2016 (2016)
15. Jiang, Y., Atif, Y., Ding, J.: Cyber-Physical Systems Security Based on a Cross-
Linked and Correlated Vulnerability Database. In: Critical Information Infrastruc-
tures Security (2020)
16. Johnson, B., Caban, D., Krotofil, M., Scali, D., Brubaker, N., Glyer, C.: Attackers
Deploy New ICS Attack Framework “TRITON” and Cause Operational Disrup-
tionto Critical Infrastructure (2017)
17. Kaspersky ICS CERT: Threat Landscape for Industrial Automation Systems
(2019)
18. Khan, R., Maynard, P., McLaughlin, K., Laverty, D., Sezer, S.: Threat analysis of
blackenergy malware for synchrophasor based real-time control and monitoring in
smart grid. In: 4th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security
Research (2016)
19. Nelson, T., Chaffin, M.: Common cybersecurity vulnerabilities in industrial control
systems. Control Systems Security Program (2011)
20. Niedermaier, M., Malchow, J.O., Fischer, F., Marzin, D., Merli, D., Roth, V.,
Von Bodisco, A.: You snooze, you lose: measuring PLC cycle times under attacks.
In: 12th USENIX Workshop on Offensive Technologies (WOOT) (2018)
21. OWASP: OWASP Top 10 - 2017: The Ten Most Critical Web Application Security
Risks (2017)
